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  Abstract 
We consider choice over a set of monetary acts (random variables) and study a general class 
of preferences. These preferences favor diversification, except perhaps on a subset of 
sufficiently disliked acts, over which concentration is instead preferred. This structure 
encompasses a number of known models in this setting. We show that such preferences can 
be expressed in dual form in terms of a family of measures of risk and a target function. 
Specifically, the choice function is equivalent to selection of a maximum index level such that 
the risk of beating the target function at that level is acceptable. This dual representation 
may help to uncover new models of choice. One that we explore in detail is the special case 
of a bounded target function. This case corresponds to a type of satisficing and has 
descriptive relevance. Moreover, the model results in optimization problems that may be 






The notion of an aspiration level rests at the core of Simon's [48] concept of bounded rationality. Namely, due
to limited cognitive resources and incomplete information, real-world decision makers may plausibly follow
heuristics in the face of risky choice. Satiscing behavior, in which the decision maker accepts the rst
encountered alternative that meets a suciently high aspiration level, may prevail.
There is indeed ample empirical evidence that aspiration levels, or \targets," play a central role in the
decision-making of many individuals. Mao [36], for instance, concludes after interviewing many executives,
that \risk is primarily considered to be the prospect of not meeting some target rate of return." Other
studies (e.g., Roy [45], Lanzilloti [31], Fishburn [20], Payne et al. [41, 42], March and Shapira [37]) reach
similar conclusions regarding the importance of targets in managerial decisions. Diecidue and van de Ven [17]
provide many more references and propose a model combining expected utility with loss and gain probabilities,
which leads to a number of predictions consistent with empirical data. Recently, Payne [40] showed that many
decision makers would be willing to accept a decrease in a gamble's expected value in order to reduce just the
probability of not beating a target.
The goal of this paper is to provide some formalism for the role of aspiration levels in rational choice
and to introduce a new model in this domain. We consider the case of a decision maker choosing from a
set of monetary acts (i.e., random variables), and dene preferences over these acts. The structure of these
preferences is fairly general: in addition to the usual properties of a weak order, a mild continuity property,
and monotonicity, the only requirement we impose is the way the decision maker treats mixtures of acts.
In particular, we assume the decision maker prefers to diversify among acts, except possibly on a subset of
suciently unfavorable choices, for which concentration is preferred. We call these preferences aspirational
preferences. In the case when the concentration favoring set is empty, diversication is always preferred. Our
denition of diversication favoring is a standard one of convex preferences.
Our main theoretical result is a dual representation for choice under such preferences. This result states
that we can equivalently express choice in terms of a family of measures of risk and a target function: in
particular, the choice function for such preferences is equivalent to a maximum index such that the risk of
beating the target function at that index is acceptable. On the set of acts for which diversication is preferred,
the risk measures are convex risk measures (F ollmer and Schied [21, 22]). In this setting of monetary acts,
a number of popular models of choice, including expected utility theory and several generalizations, are
aspirational preferences and thus have this representation.
This characterization with risk measures has a number of important implications. First, it yields po-
tentially new interpretations for existing models of choice. For instance, F ollmer and Schied [21] show that
convex risk measures have a dual description in terms of robust expected value against a malicious adversary
who is manipulating the underlying probabilities. It then follows that expected utility (for example) under
a specic distribution can be equivalently expressed in a \robust form" in which the underlying distribution
is not precisely specied. In addition, structural properties, such as stochastic dominance, can be established
directly from known properties of convex risk measures. Moreover, from an optimization standpoint, the risk
1representation is important: indeed, over acts where the choice function is quasi-concave (prefers diversica-
tion), the level sets that one must search over are in fact acceptance sets for the representing risk measure
family.
More generally, representation with risk measures and a target function potentially opens doors for new
choice models. One example of this that we explore in detail is the case when the target function is bounded.
In this case, the lower and upper limits of the target function correspond to a minimal requirement and a
satiation level, respectively. Acts that fail to attain the minimal requirement in any state are least preferred,
whereas acts that attain at least the satiation level in all states are most preferred. When the two levels
coincide, the target represents a single aspiration level. In this case of a bounded target function, we say the
decision maker has strongly aspirational preferences and call the choice function a strong aspiration measure
(SAM).
Choice under SAM seems to have noteworthy descriptive power. In particular, we nd that SAM (with
just a single target) can address the classical examples of Allais [1] and Ellsberg [19]. This model also addresses
more recent paradoxes, such as an Ellsberg-like example due to Machina [34], and predicts well choice patterns
in a set of experiments related to gain-loss separability in Wu and Markle [50].
Thus, from the theory side, we nd that a notion of targets is, to some extent, implicitly embedded in
several rational choice models and draw connections between preferences and risk measures. Pushing the limit
of this general representation to the case when the target becomes a central focus of the decision maker, we
obtain the SAM model. From the empirical side, application of SAM to some descriptive settings seems to
support the idea that aspiration levels play an important role in the decision making of individuals.
We refer the reader to some recent, related work. Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [11] axiomatize, in an Anscombe-
Aumann setting, a model of uncertainty averse preferences. These preferences are convex and monotone and
the authors provide a general representation result. Drapeau and Kupper [18] develop a similar representation
on fairly general topological spaces. Their work focuses on robustness interpretations and the representation
is presented primarily in terms of \acceptance sets," whereas ours is in the form of risk measures and target
functions. We believe this latter form has important implications: the SAM model is, to our knowledge,
new, and is motivated from this form. Also dierentiating us is that we do not require convex preferences
everywhere.
The allowance of a limited amount of risk-seeking merits a brief discussion. Risk-seeking behavior is
traditionally relegated purely to the realm of the descriptive.1 In a target-driven model like SAM, however,
there is some rationale for a decision maker to possibly prefer concentration when they have high aspirations.
Indeed, we show a consequence of the SAM model is that, under fairly mild conditions, concentration is a
necessary feature in order to be able to distinguish among acts with expected value below the target. This
property is another fairly direct result from the dual representation with convex risk measures. Intuitively, we
may reasonably expect decision makers to be willing to shun diversication and take risks when aspirations
are ambitious relative to available choices.
1Though, there is some debate on this point; one can trace some discussions back to Friedman and Savage [24] and Markowitz
[38], for instance.
2Finally, we briey contrast our work with models of target-based utility. There are interesting theoretical
connections between expected utility theory and probability of beating a benchmark on a higher dimensional
state space (see, for instance, Bordley and LiCalzi [6] and Castagnoli and LiCalzi [9]). In terms of practical
use, some issues arise with probability of beating a benchmark as a choice function. First, such a model favors
neither diversication nor concentration. This presents signicant hurdles in application to optimization
settings (e.g., portfolio choice). Second, probability of beating a benchmark is insensitive to the magnitude
of gains and losses. In contrast, choice under SAM is in general not insensitive to the size of gains and losses
and can be eciently optimized in problems with many decision variables. For tractability in optimization,
the important feature is that the choice function is be either quasi-concave or quasi-convex; we are not aware
of other models that incorporate mixed attitudes towards both risk and ambiguity that meet this criterion
(for example, prospect theory in general results in objective functions that are neither quasi-convex nor
quasi-concave).
Our outline is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the choice setting and dene aspirational preferences,
then present the main representation result. Later in this section we briey discuss the interpretation in terms
of robustness and characterize some general properties related to stochastic dominance. Section 3 is devoted
to the SAM model and some of its properties. Section 4 applies this model to the decision theory paradoxes
mentioned earlier, and Section 5 discusses optimization of the model with a portfolio choice example. Finally,
Section 6 oers some concluding remarks.
2 Aspirational preferences and dual representation
In this section, we introduce the basic choice problem we consider, then dene aspirational preferences. We
then establish a generic representation result, in terms of risk measures, for these preferences.
2.1 Model preliminaries and aspirational preferences
Our setup falls into the framework of Savage [46] in the special case of monetary acts. Specically, we consider
a set S of states of the world, endowed with a sigma-algebra . An element s 2 S is an individual state of
the world, while an element A 2  is an event. There is a set of consequences X. An element x 2 X is an
individual consequence. For our analysis, we focus exclusively on the case X = R and interpret an individual
consequence x 2 X as a monetary outcome. An act is a measurable function from S to R: its inverse applied
to any interval I  R is an event, i.e., belongs to . We denote acts by f;g;h. An act f is constant if there
is an individual consequence x 2 X such that f(s) = x for all s 2 S. In this case we write f = x. The set of
all acts on (S;) is denoted by L0(S;), while the set all bounded acts on (S;) is denoted by L1(S;). A
subset G  L1(S;) is said to be closed if it belongs to the topology endowed on L1(S;) by the sup-norm
jjfjj = sups2S jf(s)j.
For f;g 2 L0(S;) we say that f state-by-state dominates g if and only if f(s)  g(s) for all s 2 S. In
this case we write (with some abuse of notation) that f  g. We say that a mapping  from a subset G of
L0(S;) to R is nondecreasing when for all f;g 2 G, if f  g then (f)  (g).
3For f;g 2 L0(S;) and  2 [0;1], the convex combination h = f + (1   )g is dened state-by-state,
i.e., h(s) = f(s) + (1   )g(s).
While not needed generally, we will often consider cases when (S;) is endowed with a probability measure
P. A probability measure is a mapping from  to [0;1], such that P(S) = 1, P(;) = 0, and P(A [ B) =
P(A) + P(B) for all A;B 2  such that A \ B = ;. The triple (S;;P) is called a probability space. A
probability space is said to be atomless when there exists no s 2 S such that P(fsg) > 0. Moreover, given
a probability measure P on (S;) and an act f 2 L0(S;), we call the function x ! P(fs 2 S : f(s)  xg),
x 2 R, the cumulative distribution function of f with respect to P. We denote by P the set of all probability
measures on (S;).
In a setup like this, any probabilities are entirely \subjective" in the sense that they are part of the decision
maker's preference structure and not xed in advance by the model. Strictly speaking, the framework does not
formally separate uncertainty resulting from \risk" versus that from \ambiguity," as is done in an Anscombe-
Aumann [2] setting. To us, this does not seem like a severe limitation, especially for real-world applications.2
Moreover, nothing in our setup precludes the possibility of some objective, probabilistic structure in the
model, such as in the experimental settings we later consider. In these cases, decision makers would be hard
pressed to disagree on the various \objective" probabilities, and notions of risk versus ambiguity should be
clear from context.
We consider the situation of a decision maker who wants to choose an act from a closed and convex subset
F  L1(S;). Note that elements in F are assumed to be bounded.3
We model decision maker's preferences using a preference relation  on F. For acts f;g 2 F, the decision
maker weakly prefers f to g if and only if f  g. As usual,  and  are dened by [f  g , (f  g)and:(g  f)]
and [f  g , (f  g)and(g  f)]. We call a function  : F ! R [ f 1;1g a functional representation of
 when for all f;g 2 F, f  g if and only if (f)  (g).
The conditions for existence of a functional representation are well established. In the interests of formally
dening the preference relation, we make this explicit. Ultimately, our focus will be on the form of this
representation and its dual structure with risk measures. For our purposes, as explained below, we weaken
the standard assumption (e.g., Debreu [15]) of continuity.
Property 1 (Weak order and upper semi-continuity). Let  be a weak order on F that satises:
(i) For all f 2 F, the set fg 2 F : g  fg is closed in F (upper semi-continuity).
(ii) There exists H  F that is order-embeddable4 into [0;1] such that for all f;g 2 F with f  g, there
exists h 2 H such that f  h  g .
2Gilboa [26], for instance, mentions that objective probabilities are somewhat \controversial."
3The representation result that follows does not require this. One could consider more general acts in L0(S;). However, some
care would be required in handling the technical conditions for the underlying topology. For simplicity, we focus on the case of
bounded acts in our basic setup.
4H is order-embeddable into [0;1] when there exists a order-preserving function j : (H;) ! [0;1]. j is order-preserving when
it is increasing and for f;g 2 H with f  g we have j(f) > j(g).
4The assumption of a weak order is standard, while (i) and (ii) in Property 1 are technical conditions needed
to obtain a functional representation of . Properties (i) and (ii) are weaker then the standard continuity
conditions of Debreu [15], but are sucient to obtain a functional representation of .5 Indeed, for the
purposes of this paper, the classical continuity assumption is too restrictive. This is because we also want to
include in our framework preference relations in the spirit of Simon [48], e.g., f  g if and only if (f)  (g),
where  : F ! R satises (f) > 0 on ff  0g (satisfactory payos) and (f) < 0 on ff < 0g (unsatisfactory
payos). Following a generalization of Rader [43], we impose upper semi-continuity (Property (i)) on .
This is weaker than continuity and allows preference relations as mentioned. Bosi and Mehta [7] shows that
Property (i) is not only sucient for a functional representation, but also necessary if the preference relation
is separable; that is, Property (ii) holds.
We then require the following.
Property 2 (Monotonicity). For all f;g 2 F, if f  g then f  g.
Monotonicity says that an act that dominates another state-wise is preferred among the two. This is a
classical assumption on preferences, and it says that decision makers do not prefer less to more.
The nal property we impose is how preferences favor mixtures of positions.
Property 3 (Mixing). There exists a partition of F into three disjoint subsets F++, F   and F0, termed
the diversication favoring, concentration favoring and neutral sets of acts, respectively, such that for all
f 2 F++; g1; g2 2 F0; h 2 F  , we have
f  g1  g2  h;
and the following conditions hold:
(i) Diversication favoring set: For all f;g 2 F++, h 2 F, if f  h, g  h then
f + (1   )g  h 8 2 [0;1]:
(ii) Concentration favoring set: For all f;g 2 F  , h 2 F, if h  f, h  g then
h  f + (1   )g 8 2 [0;1]:
Property (i) is simply the denition of convex preferences, and it states that diversication among acts in
F++ never results in a position that is worse. This is a classical notion of risk aversion. Property (ii) says the
opposite: diversication does not help for acts in the set F  .
In our general setup, we are allowing for both risk aversion and risk seeking. Note, however, that any risk
seeking behavior that is permitted is localized on a set of less preferable acts. Intuitively, the decision maker
will consider avoiding diversication only if available choices are suciently unfavorable.
As a very simple example of a situation that may merit concentration, and as a prelude to some of
the discussion that will follow on target-oriented choice, consider a decision maker who wishes to attain a
5Debreu [15] assumes, in addition to Property (i), that fg 2 F : f  gg is closed in F.
5particular payo level. Without loss, we set this desired level to zero. Now consider a pair of acts f;g 2 F,
f;g  0, that are unfavorable in that each meets this desired payo in only a single state, and these states are
dierent across f and g. In other words, there exist s0;s00 2 S, s0 6= s00, with f(s) = 0 (g(s) = 0) if and only if
s = s0 (s = s00). For any convex combination of f and g, h = f + (1   )g for  2 (0;1), we have h < 0. If
the decision maker diversies, they will always attain a mixed position that never attains the desired payo
level. Here, it may be reasonable to prefer at least one of f or g, which each have some chance of attaining
the desired level, individually over any mixture.
While this is a very simple (and admittedly contrived) example, it illustrates an important point. Namely,
there may be situations, particularly in models of choice that focus on aspiration levels, in which some risk
seeking behavior is sensible. Note, however, that we do not impose that F   be nonempty. We allow for risk
seeking, but do not require it.
Denition 1. A decision maker with preference relation  satisfying Properties 1-3 is said to have aspira-
tional preferences on F with partition F++;F  ;F0.
The partition in Property 3 is not uniquely characterized by the preference relation  and thus the partition
is part of our denition of aspirational preferences. We note the following in cases when two dierent partitions
of F exist such that  satises Property 3.
Proposition 1. Assume that  is a preference relation on F and Property 3 holds for two dierent partitions
F++;F  ;F0 and G++;G  ;G0. Then either G++ [ G0  F++ and F   [ F0  G  , or F++ [ F0  G++
and G   [ G0  F  . It follows that for all f;g 2 F0 (and all f;g 2 G0),  2 [0;1],
f + (1   )g  g  f or g  f  f + (1   )g:
Moreover, for all f;g 2 F++ \ G   (and all f;g 2 F   \ G++),  2 [0;1], if f  g then
f  f + (1   )g  g:
Proposition 1 says that while a preference relation  can satisfy Property 3 on more than one partition of
F, there is a \natural partition," which can be constructed as follows: let H++ (H  ) be the biggest set of
diversication (concentration) favoring acts among all existing partitions and set F++ = H++n(H++\H  ),
F   = H   and F0 = F n (F++ [ F  ).
2.2 Risk measures and representation of aspirational preferences
We now show how to represent aspirational preferences in terms of a more classical denition of a \risk
measure." Risk measures are motivated from the perspective of \minimal capital requirements" to make
positions acceptable. We clarify below how this can be interpreted in our framework. Given the fairly specic
motivation for risk measures, it is intriguing that they link so closely to the seemingly more general choice
model discussed above.
Following F ollmer and Schied [21], we rst formally dene the concept of a risk measure.
6Denition 2. A function  : F ! R is a risk measure over F if it satises the following for all f; g 2 F:
1. Monotonicity: If f  g, then (f)  (g).
2. Translation invariance: If x 2 F is a constant act, then (f + x) = (f)   x.
A risk measure (f) may be interpreted as the constant act to be added to f in order to make f acceptable
by some standard. Namely, (f + (f)) = (f)   (f) = 0, i.e., adding the individual consequence x = (f)
to the act f, one obtains a new act g = f +x with \zero risk" (i.e., (g) = 0), and acts with non-positive risk
can be considered as acceptable. In other words, an act is acceptable if it does not require any additional,
guaranteed money. One can formalize the concept of acceptable acts as follows.
Denition 3. Let  : F ! R be a risk measure. The subset A of F dened by
A = ff 2 F : (f)  0g
is called the acceptance set associated to the risk measure  and f 2 A is an acceptable act.
The two properties of risk measures have clear implications for the acceptance set: if one act state-wise
dominates an acceptable act, then it must be acceptable as well. In addition, if we add a constant act
to another act, then the additional money required in order to make the second act acceptable is reduced
accordingly. We refer the reader to F ollmer and Schied [22] and the many references therein for more on risk
measures and the properties of the corresponding acceptance sets.
The class of convex risk measures has garnered much attention. Formally, we say a risk measure is convex
if, for any f; g 2 F,  2 [0;1],
(f + (1   )g)  maxf(f);(g)g (1)
and concave if
(f + (1   )g)  minf(f);(g)g: (2)
Notice that the preference relation  induced by a risk measure  will follow f  g if and only if (f) 
(g). It is not hard to see that (1) is equivalent to the preference relation  being diversication favoring
(i.e., convex preferences), and (2) is equivalent to  being concentration favoring. Historically, convex risk
measures are dened with  satisfying convexity directly, not quasi-convexity as in (1); this is equivalent.
Proposition 2. A risk measure  that is diversication favoring is equivalent to the function  being convex,
i.e., for all f; g 2 F,  2 [0;1], (f + (1   )g)  (f) + (1   )(g). Likewise, concentration favoring is
equivalent to the function  being concave.
Proposition 2 is also shown in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [10], who argue that quasi-convexity, rather than
convexity, of the risk measure function is the natural way to describe a preference for diversication.
We are now ready for the representation result. In what follows, we use the convention sup ; =  1.
7Theorem 1. A preference relation  is aspirational on F with partition F++;F  ;F0 if and only if there
exists a corresponding functional representation  : F ! R [ f 1;1g and ^ k 2 R [ f 1;1g such that 
is upper semi-continuous, nondecreasing, quasi-concave on F++, quasi-convex on F  , and (g) = ^ k for all
g 2 F0, (f) > ^ k > (h) for all f 2 F++, h 2 F  . Moreover,  has representation
(f) = supfk 2 R : k(f)  0g; (3)
where fkg is a family of risk measures, nondecreasing in k, convex if k > ^ k, concave if k < ^ k, and with
closed acceptance sets Ak. Conversely, given aspirational preferences represented by , the underlying risk
measure family is given by
k(f) = inffa 2 R : (f + a)  kg: (4)
We call the function  from Theorem 1 an aspiration measure (AM). Note that  is unique up to a
nondecreasing transformation.6 Inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the acceptance set of the
risk measure k corresponds to Ak = ff 2 F : (f)  kg.
If the risk measure (f) is to be interpreted as the constant act to be added to f in order to have zero
risk, it is natural to require (0) = 0. A risk measure satisfying this is said to be normalized. In the general
representation above, no such requirement is made on the family k. The adjusted family of risk measures
~ k(f) = k(f)   k(0) is, however, normalized.7 While the risk measures ~ k inherit convexity and concavity
properties from k, the family f~ kg is not necessarily nondecreasing in k.
Noting this, we can equivalently express choice under aspirational preferences in dual form as
(f) = supfk 2 R : ~ k(f   (k))  0g; (5)
where ~ k is normalized and (k) = k(0) is a constant act for all k. We call (k) a target act and the function
 : R ! F; k ! (k) is the target function. Clearly,  is nondecreasing.
The representation (5) provides an interpretation of choice under aspirational preferences. Such choice
can be interpreted as searching over index levels k, such that at k, the risk ~ k associated with f   (k) is
acceptable. The AM (f) then represents the maximal level at which the risk of f beating the target act at
that level is acceptable. When the sup is attained, we have the xed point relationship for :
~ (f)(f   ((f))) = 0:
Since the family f~ kg is not necessarily nondecreasing, one must exercise some care in interpreting choice
intuitively here. For k? > k, (k?)  (k) and thus f   (k?)  f   (k). An AM, therefore, assigns higher
value to acts whose risk associated with falling short of the target remain acceptable when measured against
6This can be seen as follows. Let  and ~  be two functional representations for an aspirational preference relation . Dene
T : (F) ! R as T((f)) = ~ (f) for all f 2 F. For f;g 2 F we have: (f)  (g) ) f  g ) ~ (f)  ~ (g) ) T((f))  T((g)).
Therefore, T is a nondecreasing transformation.
7~ k is clearly a risk measure: For f;g 2 F, f  g, we have ~ k(f) = k(f)   k(0)  k(g)   k(0) = ~ k(g); for f 2 F and
x 2 X, ~ k(f + x) = k(f + x)   k(0) = k(f)   x   k(0) = k(f)   k(0)   x = ~ k(f)   x.
8higher targets. In some cases, ~  may be a single normalized risk measure, in which case only the target
increases with k (we will see this is true for CARA utility maximizers). On the ip side (which will be the
case in our applications of aspirational preferences in Sections 4 and 5), the target function may be a constant
 and the risk measure family fkg may already be normalized. In this case, the target remains constant but
the risk increases in k. In general, the overall risk according to k(f) = ~ k(f   (k)) is nondecreasing in k,
as is (k), even if ~ k is not.
This dual interpretation applies to a number of choice models. We now provide some examples. When
not stated explicitly, we will assume that (S;) is endowed with a probability measure P and expectations
are taken with respect to P.
Example 1. Expected utility theory
Let u : R ! R be a continuous, nondecreasing, concave utility function satisfying u(0) = 0. The choice
function (f) = E [u(f)] is an AM. Here, the diversication favoring set F   and the neutral set F0 can
be assumed to be empty, i.e., we can take F++ = F as diversication is always (weakly) preferred. The
representing risk family is expressed as
k(f) = inf fa : E [u(f + a)]  kg
=  supfa : E [u(f   a)]  kg:
Here,  k(f) represents a maximum purchase price one would pay to assume the position f while still
attaining a level k in expected utility. When u is invertible, we have (k) = k(0) = u 1(k), i.e., the target
act is the constant act with utility k. F ollmer and Schied [22] study the class of shortfall risk measures induced
by convex, increasing loss functions l : R ! R:
short
v (f) = inf fa : E [l( f   a)]  vg:
This is clearly the same object as k here, with l(y) =  u( y) and v =  k.
For CARA utility, u(y) = 1   exp( y=R) for some R > 0, and we have













on k 2 ( 1;1). For this choice function, note that the normalized family ~ k is independent of the index
(utility) level k: all variation over the index is embedded within the target function (k).
Example 2. Maxmin EUT, Choquet utility, and variational preferences
Maxmin expected utility (MEU), developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler [27], has a similar dual representa-






EQ [u(f + a)]  k

;
9where Q  P is a set of probability measures on (S;), and we consider the case when u is nondecreasing
and concave. In this case, F = F++ again. It is known (Gilboa and Schmeidler [27]) that Choquet expected
utility (CEU) axiomatized by Gilboa [26] and Schmeidler [47] falls into the class of MEU in the important
case when the decision maker is ambiguity averse.
Generalizing the MEU model, Maccheroni et al. [33] axiomatized a model of variational preferences. Here,
choice is represented by the function
(f) = inf
Q2P
fEQ [u(f)] + c(Q)g;
where u is a dierentiable, nondecreasing utility function, and c is a nonnegative convex function on P with
infQ2P (Q) = 0. In the case of risk aversion, i.e., u concave, this falls into our setup with F++ = F.






fEQ [u(f + a)] + c(Q)g  k

:
For both MEU and variational preferences, assuming u is invertible, the target function is (k) = u 1(k).
Example 3. Acceptability, satiscing, and riskiness indices
Several recent papers have attempted to formalize denitions of risk and related measures of performance.











and has the interpretation of being the smallest risk tolerance level for a CARA decision maker such that at
that level the decision maker would accept the act f (i.e., the expected utility of f is nonnegative). It is not
hard to see that 1=r(f) yields the function
(f) = sup
n







where k 1 logE [exp( kf)] is the entropic risk measure at level k > 0. This is a convex risk measure (e.g.,
[22]) and therefore such a  is an AM. Foster and Hart [23] derive an \operational" denition of risk that has
a similar representation with logarithmic utility replacing the exponential.
Both of these denitions of risk fall into the class of satiscing measures introduced by Brown and Sim
[8], which take the form of a function:
(f) = supfk > 0 : k(f   )  0g;
where fkgk>0 is a family of normalized convex risk measures and  2 L0(S;) is a competing benchmark.
The acceptability indices of Cherny and Madan [13] fall into this framework with  = 0 when the risk measures
k are also positive homogeneous (or \coherent" according to the denition of Artzner et al. [3]).
10In all of these cases, note that one has convex preferences for any act, so F   = ;. Note also that these
indices may be attempting to provide an explicit quantity (e.g., a risk value) rather than being used directly
as a choice function. However, a nonnegative combination of an AM with the expected value function remains
an AM, so a \risk-reward" tradeo in this sense still represents choice under an AM. Alternatively, one may
imagine that the set F represents a set of available acts meeting certain conditions (e.g., suciently high
expected return in a portfolio choice setting). In this case, one of these indices could plausibly be used as a
choice function.
2.3 An ambiguity interpretation
The dual representation of this choice model in terms of convex (and concave) risk measures leads to an
interpretation of choice that explicitly accounts for ambiguity. Indeed, it is known (F ollmer and Schied [22])
that any convex risk measure  in such a setting can be represented as
(f) = sup
Q2P
f EQ [f]   (Q)g; (6)
where P is the set of all probability measures on (S;) and  : P ! R is a convex function, (Q) =
supf2A EQ [ f]. It is easy to see that if  is normalized, i.e., (0) = 0, then infQ2P (Q) = 0.
We can now express choice above using this form. Specically, if f 2 F++, then we have
(f) = sup
n




k > ^ k : sup
Q2P




k > ^ k : inf
Q2P
fEQ [f   (k)] + ~ k(Q)g  0

;
where we are using the normalized representation for the family of generating risk measures: (k) is the target
function and ~ k is a convex function corresponding to the normalized convex risk measure ~ k according to
the representation (6).
This perspective implies a robustness interpretation of choice over acts in the diversication favoring set.
Namely, the decision maker with preferences represented by  ranks acts in F++ according to an index level.
At a particular index level k, the decision maker looks at the expected value of the act in excess of the
target, where the probability measure is chosen by a malicious adversary. This adversary wishes to make the
expected value of f   (k) as small as possible, but has to pay a penalty ~ k(Q)  0 for choosing measure Q
and therefore selects a distribution that minimizes the expected value plus the penalty.
As the index level grows, both the target and the combined eect of (k) and ~ k increase. Therefore,
robustly satisfying the (penalized) expected value constraint becomes more dicult, as the adversary's power
grows. The choice function (f) thus represents the maximum index level k such that the condition
EQ [f   (k)] + ~ k(Q)  0
11holds for all probability measures Q 2 P. In this sense,  over the diversication favoring set corresponds to
a notion of robustness or security: acts with larger  can beat a higher target in expectation in a more robust
sense.
This robustness interpretation holds even if the choice function  uses an explicit probability measure in
its \primal" form. For instance, consider EUT as described earlier with utility function u and probability
measure P as in Example 1. Here, F++ = F and the choice function is (f) = EP [u(f)]. Following the


























if Q is absolutely continuous to P and +1 otherwise. Here, l is the conjugate of  u( y), i.e., l(z) =
supy2Rfzy + u( y)g.
Notice that u
k is nonincreasing in k. Thus, we can interpret an EUT maximizer as a decision maker who
prefers acts to the extent to which they have nonnegative expectation in a robust sense. Here, the notion
of robustness is tilted somehow according to the \subjective prior" P, embedded within u
k. In the case of a
CARA utility function, for example, one obtains l(z) = z logz   z + 1, which leads to a penalty u
k(Q) that
depends on the relative entropy from P to Q.
In this sense, robustness is thus a hidden feature of choice under the diversication favoring part of
aspirational preferences. Drapeau and Kupper [18] study more generally similar robust representations.
When there are acts for which concentration is preferred, the dual representation is over concave risk
measures and has a somewhat dierent interpretation. Noting that if ^  is a convex risk measure, then
(f) =  ^ ( f) is a concave risk measure, we can equivalently express choice over acts in F   as
(f) = sup
n
k < ^ k : k( f)  0
o
;
where k is a nonincreasing family of convex risk measures on k < ^ k. Using the dual representation of convex
risk measures and normalizing as above, we thus obtain the representation
(f) = sup
(
k < ^ k : sup
Q2P
fEQ [f   (k)]   ~ k(Q)g  0
)
;
where (k) is nondecreasing in k and ~ k is nonnegative. Here, since f 2 F  , the decision maker is risk
seeking and cannot hope to be robust: they are simply looking for some probability measure such that the
act beats the target in (penalized) expectation. Probability measures are not chosen by an adversary, but
rather an ally who has to pay penalty ~ k(Q) for choosing probability Q.
12As k grows, the target gets larger and the overall eect of target and penalty grow, so the ally is weaker.
In this setting,  then represents a smallest level of \assistance" the decision maker needs to provide to the
ally, such that at that level, there exists a probability measure Q such that
EQ [f   (k)]   ~ k(Q)  0
holds. Thus, for acts f 2 F  , we can interpret in this way (f) to be a measure of vulnerability.
2.4 Stochastic dominance properties
In this section, we briey characterize some stochastic dominance properties for aspiration measures when the
decision maker has an underlying probability measure P to which stochastic orders can be dened. We show
that aspiration measures share the stochastic dominance properties of their underlying risk family. Moreover,
we show that under the mild assumption that the aspiration measure is indierent to all acts with the same
distribution under P, then the aspiration measure preserves rst-order stochastic dominance (FSD) for all
acts, second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) for all acts in the diversication favoring set, and risk-seeking
stochastic dominance (RSSD) for all acts in the concentration favoring set.
We rst recall the denition of the stochastic orders just mentioned. Note that in this section, if not
specied explicitly, expectations are taken with respect to the probability measure P. We say that f dominates
g by FSD if and only if E [u(g)]  E [u(g)] for all nondecreasing functions u; in this case we write f (1) g.
Similarly, f dominates g by SSD (respectively RSSD) if and only if E [u(f)]  E [u(g)] for all u nondecreasing
and concave (respectively convex); in this case we write f (2) g (respectively f ( 2) g). Equivalent
denitions of rst order, second order and risk-seeking stochastic dominance can be found in Levy [32].
We rst note the following.
Proposition 3. Let  be a risk measure and suppose that  preserves FSD, i.e., if f (1) g then (f)  (g).
Then the risk measure  (f) =  ( f) also preserves FSD. Moreover, if  preserves SSD, then   preserves
RSSD.
Since we can always express a concave risk measure  (f) equivalently as  ( f), this proposition shows
that the property of FSD carries over from convex risk measures to concave risk measures, and SSD of a
convex risk measure implies RSSD of its concave counterpart. Given that convex risk measures are well-
studied, Proposition 3 will allow us to use known results on stochastic dominance of convex risk measures to
establish analogous such results for aspiration measures.
For this step, we rst need to show that stochastic dominance properties for aspiration measures are
implied by those of the associated family of risk measures. We now show this.
Proposition 4. Let fk : k 2 Rg be a nondecreasing family of risk measures and let  be the associated
aspiration measure. Suppose that k preserves FSD for all k. Then  preserves FSD, i.e.,
f (1) g ) (f)  (g):
13Moreover, if k preserves SSD for k > ^ k and RSSD for k < ^ k, then
8f 2 F;g 2 F++ such that f (2) g ) (f)  (g)
8f 2 F;g 2 F   such that f ( 2) g ) (f)  (g):
In general, convex risk measures do not preserve FSD or SSD, as shown by De Giorgi [16] for the case of
coherent risk measures. Therefore, Proposition 4 is of little help if we do not specify conditions on the family
of risk measures k such that stochastic dominance is preserved. It is well known that stochastic dominance
orders are fully characterized by an act's cumulative distribution function under the specied probability
measure P (see Levy [32]). When a risk measure  does not only depend on the distribution function of the
act, we can nd two acts f and g that only dier on zero-probability events, but possess dierent values for
the risk measure, e.g., (f) > (g). In this case, we can dene a third act h = f + , 0 <  < (f)   (g),
which obviously dominates f by FSD (and thus also dominates g by FSD), but (f) > (f)    = (h) and
(h) = (f)  > (g). This shows that a necessary property on risk measures in order to have preservation
of stochastic dominance orders is that they only depend on the probability distribution of the act. We thus
introduce the following.
Denition 4. Let P be a probability measure on (S;). A function r : F ! R is called law-invariant (with
respect to P) if and only if r(f) = r(g) whenever f and g have the same cumulative distribution function
under P, i.e., P(fs 2 S : f(s)  xg) = P(fs 2 S : g(s)  xg) for all x 2 R.
Law-invariance8 means the underlying mapping between the event space and the consequence space is
irrelevant; all that matters is the distribution of the acts under P. It also means that zero-probability events
do not matter, i.e., it might be that two acts dier on events A 2 , but as long as P(A) = 0, this does
not have any impact on the function r. This seems like an eminently reasonable property, common to many
models of decision making under uncertainty.
In our context, law-invariance is useful because it has strong implications for stochastic dominance.
Proposition 5. Let (S;;P) be an atomless probability space9. If  is a law-invariant aspiration measure,
then  preserves FSD on F, SSD on F++ and RSSD on F  .
3 Strongly aspirational preferences
The representation of Theorem 1 provides an interpretation of aspirational preferences in terms of risk of
beating a target function. Motivated by the strong empirical support on the importance of aspiration levels
in risky choice, we now consider a special case of these preferences when the decision maker is especially
xated on the target. In particular, we consider a bounded target function. The bounds can be interpreted
as decision maker aspiration levels: a minimal (reservation) aspiration level and a maximal (satiation) level.
8Law-invariance is also referred to as \probabilistic sophistication"; see, for instance, Machina and Schmeidler [35].
9Note that the assumption of an atomless probability space is quite weak; even random variables with discrete outcomes may
be generated (as piecewise constant functions) by atomless probability spaces.
14To place this in the context of the general framework, note that an aspiration measure  : F ! R [
f 1;1g naturally denes two target acts.10 Let u = inffa 2 R : (a) = 1g and l = inffa 2 R : (a) >
 1g, with inf ; = 1, and consider the case when both are nite. We denote by u and l the constant acts
corresponding to individual consequences with these values. Since  is nondecreasing, l  u. Moreover, for
all f 2 F with f  u, we have (f) = 1, and for all f 2 F with f < l, we have (f) =  1. Consequently, all
acts in ff 2 F : f  ug are \fully satisfactory," while all acts in ff 2 F : f < lg are \fully unsatisfactory."
When l = u =  for some nite , the target function corresponds to a single aspiration level.
This leads to the following denition.
Denition 5. An aspiration measure  : F ! R [ f 1;1g is called a strong aspiration measure (SAM) if
u = inffa 2 R : (a) = 1g and l = inffa 2 R : (a) >  1g are nite. In this case, we say the decision
maker has strongly aspirational preferences.
Analogously, we say when l and u are not both nite, as in some of the examples discussed earlier, that
the decision maker has weakly aspirational preferences and the choice function is a weak aspiration measure
(WAM). We will primarily focus on SAM for the remainder of the paper.
First, note that the acts l and u are fully characterized by the underlying family of risk measures.
Lemma 1. Let  : F ! R [f 1;1g be an aspiration measure and fkg be the corresponding family of risk
measures as dened in Equation (4). Then u = supk2R k(0) and l = infk2R k(0).
Lemma 1 also implies that for the target function  : k ! (k) = k(0) we dened in the previous section,
we have l  (k)  u.
Strongly aspirational preferences in this way capture the focus of target-driven decision-making: namely,
achieving aspiration levels is a central goal, and acts that always attain the satiation level (never attain the
reservation level) do so should be most (least) highly valued.
Since the aim of this section is also to characterize F++ and F   in case of SAM, we assume that F++ 6= ;
and F   6= ;. Then we can, without loss of generality, assume ^ k = 0 in Theorem 1 and make the following
identications:11
F0 = ff 2 F : (f) = 0g
F++ = ff 2 F : (f) > 0g
F   = ff 2 F : (f) < 0g:
(7)
Therefore, in what follows, the sign of (f) denotes whether f is in the diversication favoring set or concen-
tration favoring set.
10In what follows, we assume without loss of generality that supf2F (f) = 1 and inff2F (f) =  1. Indeed, if supf2F (f) =
u and inff2F (f) = l, where u;l 2 R, then one can easily dene a strictly increasing and continuous transformation T such
that T  satisfy the above conditions. Since T is strictly increasing and continuous, T  describes the same preference relation
as  and also maintains all its properties as given in Theorem 1.
11Since F++ 6= ; and F   6= ;, then ^ k in Theorem 1 is nite and we can shift  by the constant ^ k.
153.1 Symmetric SAM
Though convex risk measures are well-studied, concave risk measures are not. We can, however, easily
construct families of concave risk measures from convex families. We now discuss this.
Proposition 6. Consider a family of convex risk measures fk : k 2 (0;1)g that is nondecreasing on k 2
(0;1), with infk>0 k(0)  0 and supk>0 k(0) < 1. Let  k(f) =   k( f) + infk>0 k(0) for all f 2 F
and k 2 ( 1;0). Then, the family of risk measures f k : k 2 ( 1;0)g is concave and nondecreasing on
k 2 ( 1;0). Moreover,
 s(f)  t(f) 8s < 0;t > 0:
Proposition 6 implies that a family of convex risk measures fkg on k > 0 with infk>0 k(0)  0 and
supk>0 k(0) < 1 can fully generate a SAM by reecting the risk measures to generate the required concave
family on k < 0. We additionally dene 0(f) = infk>0 k(f) ( supk<0 k(f)) and call the family of risk
measures fk : k 2 Rg a symmetric family. The corresponding SAM is also said to be symmetric. One can
easily show that for a symmetric SAM, we have l = infk>0 k(0)   u.
3.2 Examples of strong aspiration measures
We now provide some examples of SAMs. In Examples 4-6, we focus on the case of symmetric SAM with
u = l = , which will be also considered in our applications of SAM in Section 4. In these examples we set
 = 0 which is without loss simply by shifting acts by a constant; f then represents value in excess of the
target  and k(0) = 0 for all k. Finally, in Examples 4-6 we assume that (S;) is endowed with a probability
measure P and expectations are taken with respect to P.




lnE [exp( kf)] k 6= 0;
is a symmetric family of nondecreasing risk measures that are convex for k > 0. The associated symmetric






lnE [exp( kf)]  0

;
which we call the entropic strong aspiration measure (ESAM). If f is normally distributed under P, then we




2 is the variance of f. Therefore, k rewards
(i.e., has less \risk") greater variance. In this case, we have (f) = 2E [f]=2(f). Here, the diversication
favoring set are those acts with positive expected value, and the concentration favoring set are those with
negative expected value. For a xed, positive expected value, one prefers smaller variance (risk aversion). For
acts with a xed, negative expected value, however, one prefers larger variance: the intuition is that larger
variance gives one better hopes of attaining the target.
The positive part of the above representation yields the entropic satiscing measure of Brown and Sim [8],
which is also the reciprocal of the riskiness index of Aumann and Serrano [4].






CVaRe k (f) if k > 0
 CVaRek ( f) if k < 0
where










is a symmetric family of nondecreasing risk measures that are coherent (convex and positive homogeneous;





supfk > 0 : CVaRe k (f)  0g if E [f]  0;
supfk < 0 : CVaRek ( f)  0g otherwise;
which we call the CVaR SAM. A variant of this measure (without the risk seeking part and scaled to be on







k > 0 :
( 1(e k))
e k (f)  E [f]
o
if E [f]  0;
sup
n
k < 0 :
( 1(ek))
ek (f)   E [f]
o
otherwise;
where  and  are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively. The SAM
in this case is a monotonic transformation of the ratio E [f]=(f), called the Sharpe ratio.








faln(E [exp( f=a)]) + akg if k > 0
sup
a<0
faln(E [exp( f=a)])   akg if k < 0







k > 0 : inf
a>0
falnE [exp( f=a)] + akg  0

if E [f]  0;
sup

k < 0 : sup
a<0
falnE [exp( f=a)]   akg  0

otherwise.









which is again a monotonic transformation of the Sharpe ratio.
17Example 7. General symmetric family
Let fkgk2R be a family of functions on the space P of probability measures on (S;), such that k
is convex for k > 0, k(Q) is non-increasing in k, and k(Q) =   k(Q) for all Q 2 P. Additionally,




f EQ [f]   k(Q)g =   inf
Q2P
fEQ [f] + k(Q)g; (8)
for k > 0 is a family of convex risk measures. This family in turn generates the concave family
 k(f) =   sup
Q2P
fEQ [f]    k(Q)g
=   sup
Q2P
fEQ [f] + k(Q)g
for k < 0, which can be interpreted as the (negative of the) best case penalized expected value over all





k > 0 : inf
Q2P




k < 0 : sup
Q2P
fEQ [f] + k(Q)g  0
))
:
3.3 Properties and interpretation of the partition
In this section we again consider the case where (S;) is endowed with a probability measure P. Stochastic
dominance properties are with respect to P and expectations are taken with respect to P, when not stated
explicitly.
As choice with SAM is a special case of choice under an aspiration measure, it follows that all results
on stochastic dominance discussed in Section 2.4 apply to choice under SAM: namely, SAM will inherit the
stochastic dominance properties of the underlying family of risk measures. For symmetric SAM, if fkg on
k > 0 satises FSD, then so will the SAM, and, if the family satises SSD, then the SAM satises SSD
on the diversication favoring set and RSSD on the concentration favoring set. Finally, choice under a law-
invariant SAM automatically satises FSD everywhere, SSD on the diversication favoring set, and RSSD on
the concentration favoring set when the probability space is atomless.
On atomless probability spaces, law-invariant risk measures also display important boundedness properties.
We say that a convex (concave) risk measure ~  is bounded from below (above) by the expectation when
~ (f)  E [ f] (~ (f)  E [ f]) for all f 2 F. F ollmer and Schied [22] show that law-invariant convex
risk measures are bounded from below by the expectation on atomless probability spaces. This implies that
concave risk measures are bounded from above by the expectation. Namely, if ~  is law-invariant and concave
then ~ (f) =  ~ ( f) is law-invariant and convex, thus ~ (f)  E [ f], or equivalently, ~ (f)  E [ f]. We now
show that these boundedness properties have important implications for the structure of the diversication
favoring and concentration favoring sets.
18Theorem 2. Let fkg be a nondecreasing family of risk measures inducing SAM . If, for k > 0, ~ k =
k  k(0) is bounded from below by the expectation and for k < 0, ~ k = k  k(0) is bounded from above by
the expectation, then
E [f] < l ) (f)  0
E [f]  u ) (f)  0:
If the probability space is not atomless, then it is generally not true that a convex (concave) risk measure
is bounded from below (above).12 In many cases, however, convex (concave) risk measures are bounded from
below (above) even if the probability space is not atomless. This is the case for the convex risk measures of
Examples 4-6, as shown in the following proposition. Recall that in these examples, we had a single target
l = u = , and took, without loss,  = k(0) = 0 for all k.
Proposition 7. The underlying families of risk measures in ESAM, CVaR SAM and HESAM are bounded
by the expectation, i.e., k(f)  E [ f] for k > 0 and k(f)  E [ f] for k < 0.
We emphasize the generality of Theorem 2, which applies not only to any law-invariant SAM on an
atomless probability space, but also to several SAMs on non-atomless spaces as seen in Proposition 7.
The result has a number of noteworthy implications. First, this provides a characterization of the \parti-
tion" describing where diversication and concentration are preferred in terms of expected values. Acts that
fail to attain l on average cannot be in the diversication favoring set, whereas acts that attain at least u on
average cannot be in the concentration favoring set. Conversely, acts that are in the diversication favoring
set must satisfy E [f]  l, and acts in the concentration favoring set must satisfy E [f] < u. Note that this
structure relating risk attitudes to expected values is purely a consequence of the SAM model.
Second, Theorem 2 also has an implication for choice under SAM. In particular, consider f;g 2 F with
E [f] > u  l > E [g]. Note that in order to compute these expected values nothing about the structure of
the underlying risk measures is required. Theorem 2 implies that any decision maker using SAM (with the
underlying risk family satisfying the boundedness properties) will either prefer f to g or be indierent between
the two. Thus, f can be taken as the (weakly) preferred act in all cases. For expected utility maximizers, by
contrast, all rankings are possible: the ranking will depend on the specic structure of the decision maker's
utility function, which must therefore rst be specied. In such settings, therefore, the decision maker using
a SAM can simplify their decision problem by disregarding acts with expected payos lower than l.
Finally, this insight into the partition also provides some prescriptive grounds for favoring concentration
in the case of a target-oriented model, as we now explain. Indeed, consider a similar model of choice that
favors diversication everywhere, i.e., represented by the function ~ , with
~ (f) = supfk : k(f)  0g;
where fkg is a family of convex risk measures bounded below by the expectation such that u = l = 0
(the single-target assumption is not needed but made to simplify the discussion). It is not hard to see that
12Rockafellar et al. [44] add boundedness as an additional property on convex risk measures for their class of deviation measures.
19E [f] < 0 implies that f  g for all g 2 F. Indeed, since k(f)   E [f] > 0 for all k, and ~ (f) =  1 by
convention, such acts are minimally preferred over F.
In particular, target-oriented choice under a model that favors diversication everywhere cannot distinguish
between acts expected to fall short of the target: the preference relation is indierent to all such acts. Thus,
in order to be useful for decision makers with aggressive targets, it is crucial to allow for some concentration-
favoring preferences. It does not seem unreasonable for decision makers to \roll the dice" and concentrate
resources, rather than diversify them, when their ambitions are high relative to available choices.
4 Strongly aspirational preferences and some paradoxes
In this section, we apply choice under strong aspirational preferences to several paradoxes of decision theory.
We rst look at some problems that fall into the domain of Allais [1] and Ellsberg [19], then move on to a
discussion of gain-loss separability, which is an issue in prospect theory.
In what follows, we exclusively consider the case of symmetric SAM with a single target (l = u = ).
Recall that this is a special case of strongly aspirational preferences; application of the model with l < u
may further enhance the model's descriptive relevance.
4.1 Application to Allais
Consider the following two pairs of gambles:
Gamble A: Wins $500,000 for sure.
Gamble B: 1% chance of 0, 10% chance of winning $2,500,000 and 89% chance of winning $500,000,
along with
Gamble C: 90% chance of 0, 10% chance of winning $2,500,000.
Gamble D: 89% chance of 0, 11% chance of winning $500,000.
The most typical pattern of preferences observed among actual decision makers is to choose A over B and C
over D. It is not hard to see that this is inconsistent with traditional expected utility theory with any utility
function.
In contrast, these choice pairs can in fact be consistent with choice under SAM over a specic range of a
xed target. For instance, let  be any law-invariant SAM and let  be the target. We further assume that the
corresponding family of risk measures satises the boundedness properties of Theorem 2. Denoting gamble
A by fA, we have, for   $500,000, (fA   ) = 1, so fA     fB   . On the other hand, the expected
value of gamble C is $250,000 and the expected value of gamble D is $55,000; therefore, using Theorem 2, for
 > $55,000,  < $250,000, we have (fC   )  0  (fD   ), so the observed pattern above is (weakly)
resolved over  2 ($55;000;$250;000).
20In fact, for several SAM, this pattern of preferences will be observed over an even larger range of targets.
This is shown in Table 2.
In all three cases, gamble A is strictly preferred to gamble B for   $500,000, and gamble C is strictly
preferred to gamble D for  2 (;$2;000;000), for some 0 <  < $55;000. The intuition in the rst pair is
that gamble A is guaranteed to hit the $500,000 target; for the second case, as long as the target is not very
small, the extra \upside" of $2,500,000 versus $500,000 outweighs the small dierence in probabilities of zero
payos. It seems plausible that this type of intuition is being used by the decision makers who make such
choices.13
4.1.1 Common consequence eect
We now briey generalize the above pattern over a pair of choices. The eect above, rst pointed out by
Allais [1], is typically called the common consequence eect.
Formally, consider two positive payos x > y > 0 and two probabilities q 2 (0;1), p 2 (0;1), with q > p.
As before, we denote the rst pair of gambles A and B. Gamble A is a sure payo of y; B, on the other hand,
pays o x with probability p, y with probability 1   q, and 0 with probability q   p.
The second pair is a pair of all-or-nothing gambles, which we denote C and D. Gamble C pays o x with
probability p and 0 otherwise; D pays o y with probability q and 0 otherwise. We will assume gamble C
beats gamble D in expectation, i.e., px > qy, though we could remove this assumption in what follows.
In observed choices, particularly when x is considerably larger than y and q p is small, real-world decision
makers often prefer the \safer" choice among the rst two gambles (i.e., the sure payo of A over the risky
payo B) and the \riskier" choice among the second two gambles (i.e., C over D). The rationale, presumably,
is along the lines that A oers a sure payo, whereas B can result in a zero payo; for the second pair, though
C has a slightly higher chance of paying o nothing, this extra risk may well be worth bearing if the dierence
x   y is large.
This is easily seen to be inconsistent with expected utility theory. Let u be any utility function, normalized
to u(0) = 0. Then strict preference of A over B implies u(y) > pu(x) + (1   q)u(y) ) qu(y) > pu(x); on
the other hand, strict preference of C over D implies pu(x) > qu(y), a contradiction. This fundamentally
occurs because of the independence axiom, which imposes the requirement that common components of any
two gambles be irrelevant to the direction of the preference.
The common consequence eect can be explained by SAM over an explicit range of targets; we show a
formal result for entropic SAM.
Proposition 8. Consider the two pairs of gambles, (A,B) and (C,D), as described above with px > qy
and let  denote the entropic strong aspiration measure and k denote the entropic risk measure at level k.
Then for every (x;y;p;q) as above, there exists a target (x;y;p;q) = ? < qy such that for all  2 (?;y],
13It is worth mentioning that having some risk-seeking behavior is unnecessary to address the example of Allais; the resolution
would still hold without this, but over a smaller range of targets.
21(fA   ) > (fB   ) and (fC   ) > (fD   ). Moreover, we have
? =  ?(fD);
where ? is the unique  > 0 such that (fC) = (fD).
Notice that the entropic SAM is linked to an expected utility representation with an exponential function
(CARA utility). Despite this connection, however, the implications for choice may be drastically dierent
than those implied by the expected utility function.
4.1.2 Common ratio eect
The common ratio eect is a related well-known pattern of many observed preferences, again famously pointed
out by Allais [1], that cannot be captured by EUT. This phenomenon is again found in the preferences typically
observed over two pairs of gambles. Consider two positive real numbers x > y > 0 and two probabilities
q 2 (0;1), p 2 (0;1).
We denote the rst pair of gambles by A and B. The rst, A, involves a sure bet of y. The second, B,
pays o x with probability p and 0 with probability 1   p.
The second pair of gambles, C and D, involves two risky bets: C pays o x with probability p(1   q) and
0 otherwise; D pays o y < x with probability 1   q and 0 otherwise. Note that we can view both of these
as a composition of two biased coin ips; rst, a coin with probability 1   q of getting a head (i.e., a positive
payo), then a coin with probability p of getting a head. C pays o x if both coins get heads; D pays o y
if the rst coin gets a head regardless of the outcome of the second coin. Note that, conditional on the rst
coin getting a head, C and D oer the exact same gambles as A and B.
In many settings, it is well-known that real-world decision makers prefer A over B while also preferring
C over D. For instance, consider p = :8, q = :75, x = 16, and y = 10. Many subjects prefer the sure payo
of y = 10 over the 80% chance of x = 16 in the rst case; in the second case, however, even though C oers
a lower chance of a positive payo (20% vs. 25%), the extra upside of x = 16 vs. y = 10 is well worth the
extra 5% chance of zero payo. Again, it is easy to see that such a pattern of preferences is inconsistent with
expected utility theory.
We now show that this eect can in general be captured by SAM over an explicit range of targets. As
with the common consequence eect, we prove the result for entropic SAM.
Proposition 9. Consider the two pairs of gambles, (A,B) and (C,D), as described above and let  denote
the entropic strong aspiration measure and k denote the entropic risk measure at level k. Then for every
(x;y;p;q) as above, there exists a target (x;y;p;q) = ? < y such that for all  2 (?;y), (fA ) > (fB )
and (fC   ) > (fD   ). Moreover, we have
? =  ?(fD)
? = (fB   y):
22Notice that when px = y, i.e., both pairs of gambles are equal in expectation, we obtain ? = 0 and thus
? = E [fD] = (1   q)y. When px > y, the decision maker will prefer C over D for some targets strictly less
than (1   q)y. When px < y, there is still a range of targets for which C is preferred, but ? > (1   q)y;
in this case, the risk-seeking part of the aspiration measure is at work, and decision makers must have an
appreciably high target such that the extra upside provided by C is worth it.
4.2 Application to Ellsberg
In this section, we will show that strongly aspirational preferences can be consistent with behavioral choices
when the probability distributions of uncertain payos are unknown. Ellsberg's [19] famous experiments
provide interesting insights that decisions made under ambiguity can be inconsistent with expected utility
theory. Again, we will show that the SAMs can be extended to handle ambiguity and illustrate that we can
resolve Ellsberg's paradoxes across a fairly wide range of targets.
To encompass ambiguity in SAM, we now conne the probability measure to a family of distributions, Q.
Intuitively speaking, the greater the size of the family Q, the greater the level of ambiguity. In particular, if
the family is a singleton, i.e., Q = fPg, then the underlying probability measure is unambiguously specied.
Ambiguity has already been studied in convex risk measures (see F ollmer and Schied, [22]), which are
the building blocks of SAMs. Given a law-invariant family of risk measures, P;k(f), evaluated under the
probability measure P, we can extend this to family of risk measures to encompass ambiguity. For k > 0, we




which retains the convexity of the risk measure. For k < 0, the concave counterpart is given by
 k(f) = inf
Q2Q
 Q;k(f);
which corresponds to an ambiguity favoring risk measure. For example, we can extend versions of the CVaR,
entropic, and homogenized entropic risk measures in this way to handle ambiguity.
We note the following about the structure of the partition with the corresponding SAM that explicitly
incorporates ambiguity.
Theorem 3. Given a nondecreasing family of risk measures, fQ;kg (convex for k > 0, concave for k < 0)
with Q;k(f) Q;k(0)  EQ [ f] if k > 0 and Q;k(f) Q;k(0)  EQ [ f] if k < 0, and  1 < l  Q;k(0) 
u < 1. Consider the SAM








Q;k(f) if k > 0
inf
Q2Q
Q;k(f) if k < 0
23for some Q  P. Then the following implications hold:
9Q 2 Q : EQ [f] < l ) (f)  0
9Q 2 Q : EQ [f]  u ) (f)  0:
Observe that if there exist Q1;Q2 2 Q such that EQ1 [f] < l and EQ2 [f]  u, then f is in the neutral
set, i.e., (f) = 0.
4.2.1 Ellsberg's two-color experiment
The setup for Ellsberg's two-color experiment is as follows. Box 1 contains 50 red balls and 50 blue balls.
Box 2 contains red and blue balls in unknown proportions. In the rst test, subjects are given the following
two choices:
Gamble A: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 1 is red.
Gamble B: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 2 is red.
In the second test, subjects have to decide between the two choices:
Gamble C: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 1 is blue.
Gamble D: Win $100 if ball drawn from Box 2 is blue.
In the experimental ndings, the majority of subjects are ambiguity averse and strictly prefer gamble
A over gamble B and gamble C over gamble D, while a smaller portion are actually ambiguity favoring
and strictly prefer gamble B over gamble A and gamble D over gamble C. Ellsberg argues the experimental
ndings are inconsistent with the subjective expected utility theory. The reasoning is as follows: individuals
who strictly prefer gamble A over gamble B may perceive that in Box 2, red balls are fewer in number than
blue ones. In doing so, they would prefer gamble D over gamble C, which is inconsistent with the experimental
ndings.
Under Theorem 2, if the corresponding risk measures satisfy the boundedness properties, a SAM on
gambles A and C yields non-negative or non-positive values when the target is below or above $50, respectively.
Specic SAMs, such as those based on CVaR, entropic and homogenized entropic risk measures, are strictly
positive or negative when the target is below or above $50, respectively. In contrast, Theorem 3 implies that
for any target between $0 and $100, these SAMs on gambles B and D, which have unknown distributions, are
neutral and thus have a value of zero. Therefore, the preference induced by these SAMs are consistent with
the experimental observations.
Clearly, Ellsberg's paradox can also be resolved by several models of weakly aspirational preferences
(convex or concave risk measures or by worst-case or best-case expected utility under ambiguity depending
on whether the individuals are ambiguity averse or favoring (see, e.g., F ollmer and Schied [22] or Gilboa and
Schmeidler [27])). The dierence here, however, is that SAMs suggest that the ambiguity preferences depend
heavily on the aspiration levels of the subjects. This allows the model to be consistent with some other
24plausible choice patterns for variations of the Ellsberg experiment. For instance, if the number of red balls
in Box 1 were known to be much smaller, we expect decision makers would largely prefer gambles B and C.
This remains consistent with SAM.
4.2.2 Ellsberg's three-color experiment
In the three color experiment, a box contains 30 red balls and 60 black and yellow balls with unknown
proportions. In the rst test, subjects choose between the following gambles:
Gamble A: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is black or yellow.
Gamble B: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is red or yellow.
In the second test, they have to decide between the two choices:
Gamble C: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is black.
Gamble D: Win $300 if ball drawn from the box is red.
In gamble A, the probability of winning the $300 prize is 2/3 and the expected payo is $200. In contrast,
the probability of winning the same prize in gamble B ranges from 1/3 to 1. In gamble C, the probability of
winning the prize ranges from 0 to 2/3. On the other hand, the probability of winning in gamble D is exactly
1/3 and the expected payo is $100.
Subjective expected utility theory postulates that individuals who prefer gamble A over gamble B should
also prefer gamble C over gamble D. Ellsberg's experiment reveals, however, that individuals who prefer gamble
A over gamble B also tended to prefer gamble D over gamble C; likewise, Ellsberg found that individuals who
preferred gamble B over gamble A also tended to prefer gamble C over gamble D.
We present in Table 3 the SAM values for all the gambles evaluated using the ambiguity version of the
SAMs based on entropic, homogenized entropic and CVaR risk measures. The preferences induced on these
gambles by these SAMs are the same. Gamble A is preferred over gamble B if the target is less than $200
and a reversal of preference occurs when the target exceeds $200. On the other hand, gamble D is preferred
over gamble C if the target falls below $100 and a reversal of preference occurs when the target exceeds $100.
Thus, choice under these SAMs is consistent with the experimental ndings of Ellsberg over the target ranges
  $100 and   $200.
4.2.3 Another Ellsberg-like example
Machina [34] recently pointed out the following Ellsberg-like example, shown in Table 1. In this example,
there are are 101 balls in an urn, and it is known that 50 balls are labeled 1 or 2, and 51 balls are labeled 3
or 4. The exact number of balls with each label is, however, unknown. The decision maker is then oered the
two separate bets listed in Table 1.
Although Choquet expected utility can successfully address the classical Ellsberg examples from above,
Machina [34] shows that with CEU, f1 is preferred to f2 if and only if f3 is preferred to f4, then argues why
25First pair of bets
50 balls 51 balls
E1 E2 E3 E4
f1 $8k $8k $4k $4k
f2 $8k $4k $8k $4k
Second pair of bets
50 balls 51 balls
E1 E2 E3 E4
f3 $12k $8k $4k $0
f4 $12k $4k $8k $0
Table 1: Example from Machina [34].
such a pattern may not be observed with decision makers who have some ambiguity aversion. The reason CEU
requires this is due to a comonotonicity principle that says that order-preserving shifts of acts by common
amounts on identical events cannot reverse rankings. Here, one can see that (f3;f4) are obtained by a common
tail shift of (f1;f2) (adding $4k in E1 and subtracting $4k in E4), which means that a CEU maximizer must
satisfy f1  f2 if and only if f3  f4. Baillon et al. [5] show that Machina's example is also problematic for
maxmin expected utility and variational preferences.
We apply choice under ESAM over the range of targets  2 (0;$12k] to this example, and the results
are shown in Table 4. Across a wide range of  we see (nonstrict) violations of the comonotonicity principle
just mentioned. In fact, the only ranges for which it is not violated are quite small:  2 [infQ EQ [f3];$4k] 
[$3:96k;$4k],  2 [supQ EQ [f3];$8k]  [$7:96k;$8k], as well as precisely at the single target  = E [f1] 
$5:98k. Though no studies were performed, Machina [34] conjectured many decision makers may prefer
f1 and f4, and this pattern is (nonstrictly) satised by choice with ESAM over the middle target range
 2 [$3:96k;$5:98k] and also for  > $8k.
4.3 Gain-loss separability
It is known that both prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky [30]) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky
and Kahneman [49]) require a strong condition of gain-loss separability: namely, if both the gain and the loss
portion of one gamble are favored over another one, then the same direction of preference must hold for the full
(\mixed") gambles themselves. Wu and Markle [50] have shown systematic violations of gain-loss separability
in experimental studies. As choice under SAM has both risk aversion and risk seeking, it is interesting to
examine implications for gain-loss separability under SAM.
Specically, Wu and Markle [50] consider two gambles, High and Low, each with some probability of
a positive payo and some probability of a negative payo. For gamble High (Low), the payos are G or
26L with probability p and 1   p (G0 or L0 with probability p0 and 1   p0). In all trials, it is assumed that
G > G0 > 0 > L > L0.
In \act" notation, we denote the two gambles by fHigh and fLow. For act f, the notation f+ denotes the
act f+(s) = max(f(s);0) for all s 2 S, i.e., the gain part of the act, and the notation f  denotes the act
f (s) = min(f(s);0) for all s 2 S, i.e., the loss part of the act.
Wu and Markle [50] show violations of gain-loss separability by nding experimental violations of double





Low =) fHigh  fLow;
and is a necessary requirement for gain-loss separability (thus violations of double matching are even stronger
than violations of gain-loss separability).
It is not hard to see that choice under SAM need not satisfy double matching. As one example, consider
ESAM with a target of zero. Since f+
High  0 and f+
Low  0, then (f+
High) = (f+
Low) = 1, so f+
High  f+
Low. In
addition, for the entropic risk measure, f  0 with f(s) < 0 for some state with nonzero probability implies
 k(f) > 0 for all k < 0. This in turn implies that (f 
High) = (f 
Low) =  1, so f 
High  f 
Low. On the other
hand, the gambles High and Low are dierent, so, in general, it will not be the case that (fHigh) = (fLow),
and therefore double matching is violated.
Table 5 shows application of ESAM with zero target to a set of experiments from Wu and Markle [50].
ESAM violates double matching in every trial. What is perhaps more interesting is that the ESAM seems
to match well the preferences of the subject majority over the mixed gambles: namely, the High gamble is
preferred in 29 of the 34 trials, whereas a majority of the subjects preferred the High gamble in 27 of the 34
trials. Moreover, of the 5 cases in which we found (fLow) > (fHigh), 3 corresponded to cases in which a
strong majority preferred Low over High (trials 1, 2, and 3; for trial 6, the subjects were nearly evenly split,
and ESAM slightly favored Low over High). All told, simple application of ESAM with zero target matched
the majority of subjects in 28 of the 34 cases.
While choice under ESAM seems to match the subject behavior well here, more experimentation and study
is required. The important feature that we want to emphasize is that SAM does not treat decompositions of
gambles into losses and gains at all the same way that prospect theory does.
5 Optimization of aspiration measures
In this section we discuss the issue of optimization of the AM choice function. The model is amenable to large-
scale optimization, which is important for use in applications with many decision variables. An immediate one
that comes to mind is portfolio optimization. We will provide an example of this here. While this example is
by no means intended to be a completely realistic model of portfolio choice, it serves the purpose of illustrating
the relevant computational issues at hand.
Specically, given a AM , we consider the problem
z = supf(f) : f 2 Fg; (9)
27where F is the convex hull f
Pn
i=1 wi fi :
Pn
i=1 wi = 1;wi  0; 8i = 1;:::;ng of n available assets. Here, the
\act" fi corresponds to the uncertain return, in excess of a desired target return , for asset i.
From a computational perspective, nding a feasible solution in a convex set is relatively easy compared
to nding a feasible solution in a non-convex one. Observe that for k > ^ k, the acceptance set
Ak = ff 2 F : (f)  kg;
which can be empty, is convex. If the diversication favoring set is nonempty, i.e., F++ 6= ;, we can eciently
obtain the optimal solution to Problem (9) using the binary search procedure of Brown and Sim [8]. Otherwise,
if this set is empty (which only happens if the target  is suciently large), we have z  ^ k. In this case, each
of the extreme points fi must either be in F0 or F  . If one of them, say fj, is in F0, then if the diversication
favoring set is empty, (fj) = ^ k attains the highest AM value over F.
Otherwise, all n available assets are in the concentration favoring set. Then, by quasi-convexity of  in




and we can simply enumerate the AM values for the n assets and choose the largest one in this case.
We now demonstrate this concretely on an asset allocation problem in which the underlying marginal
distributions of assets' returns are not known exactly, while assets' returns are assumed to be independent.
Here, independence is assumed for sake of simplicity, but we can easily extend the results to also incorporate
dependence; see for instance Hall et al. [29]. We thus consider n assets with independent returns fi, i =
1;:::;n. The exact marginal distribution of fi is unknown but can be characterized by its support [f
i;fi], i.e.,
the probability that fi belongs to [f
i;fi] is one. Also, the mean of fi is unknown and lies in [
i;i]  [f
i;fi].












wi = 1; wi  0; i = 1;:::;n
)
;
where  is a given target return. The decision variables are the n weights wi for each available asset.
We consider the case of  as ESAM. Since the returns are independently distributed, the underlying risk





























EP [exp( kwi fi)] + 
for k > 0 and k < 0, and Q is the set of probability measures such that for each asset i fi possesses a feasible
distribution (with the given support [f
i;fi] and mean in the corresponding interval [
i;i] ) and returns are
independent.
28Proposition 10. Let f be an act (random variable) and Q be the set of all probability measures such that f







pexp(af) + q exp(af) if a  0
pexp(af) + q exp(af) otherwise,
where p = (f   )=(f   f), q = 1   p, p = (f   )=(f   f) and q = 1   p.
Given a target , Proposition 10 enables us to compute the ESAM for this problem. Here, there is
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:
Hence, if (fi ) < 0 for all i, then all assets are in the concentration favoring set, and it is optimal to invest











i exp( wi kfi)) +   0;
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i = (fi   
i)=(fi   f
i), q
i = 1   p
i. The decision variables are the ESAM level k and weights wi.
By replacing k with its reciprocal, we can essentially obtain the optimal portfolio allocation by solving the









i exp( wi fi=a)) +   0;
n X
i=1
wi = 1; a > 0; wi  0; i = 1;:::;n
)
;
which can be solved, in high dimension, eciently using interior point methods.14
We now present a numerical example based on the information presented in Table 6. Note that the asset
returns are dened such that asset 1 is a risk-free asset that pays 2% in all states. Assets 2 to 6 are risky
assets, with asset 2 being the one with lowest downside and upside and asset 6 being the one the highest
downside and upside. We solve the optimal asset allocation for various targets as shown in Table 7. The
lowest target corresponds to the risk-free rate. Here, the investor can reach the target for sure by investing
in asset 1. As the target increases, the risk-free asset becomes less attractive, as it fails to attain the target
with certainty. The investor puts some wealth into the risky assets. If the target becomes very high, i.e., the
investor is ambitious, then they only hold asset 6, the asset with the highest upside potential and a positive
probability of beating the target.
This example demonstrates the intuitive idea that if the investor possesses a high target return, then they
will be willing to take more risk. This pattern is similar to that observed in mutual fund managers during the
technology bubble of the 1990's (Dass et al. [14]). Managers with high contractual incentives to rank at the
top (i.e., those with a high target) adopted the aggressive and risky strategy to not invest in bubble stocks,
as avoiding the herd was the only way to highly outperform the market.
14For this example, it is convenient to use a solver that can explicitly handle the \exponential cone"; here we use the software
package ROME [28] to solve our example problem.
29We are not aware of other models that can accommodate diering attitudes towards both risk and ambi-
guity in a computationally tractable way. Maximizing the probability of beating a target is a highly dicult
optimization problem in general (Nemirovksi and Shaprio [39], for instance, show that even computing the
distribution of a sum of uniform random variables is NP-hard15). Prospect theory is also quite dicult to
use - Chen et al. [12] show that optimization of the expected value of an \S-shaped" value function over
box constraints is NP-hard. The -maxmin model (Ghirardato et al. [25]) allows for ambiguity seeking and
aversion but results in a choice function that is neither convex nor concave.
While all these models have important implications both theoretically and descriptively, they are dicult
to use in optimization settings, and computing globally optimal solutions in general can only be done with
enumeration across grid-based approximations. On a grid with 1% resolution, this approach on this six-asset
example would require computation and comparison of 1012 values. By contrast, on a standard desktop
machine, optimization of ESAM here takes about one second.
6 Discussion
We have considered the problem of risky choice over monetary acts (random variables) and examined the case
of a fairly generic preference structure over such acts. In addition to the usual properties of a weak order
and a mild continuity property, the preference relation obeys state-wise monotonicity and convex preferences,
except perhaps on a set of unfavorable acts for which concentration is preferred. We have shown a dual
representation of these aspirational preferences. This states that we can express aspirational preferences in
terms of a maximum index level at which a measure of risk of beating a target function is acceptable.
This result provides a dual interpretation of a number of models in this context, including expected utility
theory and several generalizations, and perhaps opens the door to new models of choice. One that we then
considered here is the special case when the target function is bounded. These strongly aspirational preferences
are partly motivated from the perspective of bounded rationality and, though more research is required, seem
to have empirical potential. This corroborates a body of work that suggests that aspiration levels play a key
role in individual decision-making.
An application like portfolio choice, where performance is often adjusted relative to a benchmark, may
be a natural t for the SAM model. One important feature of this model is that it is relatively amenable
to large-scale optimization. In addition to considering new classes of choice models in this framework and
investigating in more depth the empirical implications of strongly aspirational preferences, exploring use of
the model in applications like this is of interest.
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Proof of Proposition 1
First, suppose that F++ 6= G++. Then either F++ \(G0 [ G  ) 6= ; or G++ \(F0 [ F  ) 6= ;. Without loss
of generality we assume that F++ \ (G0 [ G  ) 6= ;. Let f 2 F++ \ (G0 [ G  ).
If G++ [ G0 = ;, then G   = F. Obviously,
G++ [ G0 = ;  F++
and
F   [ F0  F = G  :
If G++[G0 6= ;, then take g 2 G++[G0. Since f 2 G0[G   then g  f. Since f 2 F++, then g 2 F++.
Therefore,
G++ [ G0  F++
and
F   [ F0 = F++  G  :
33Since G0  F++ and F++ \ F0 = ;, then F0 \ G0 = ;. It is clear that from G0  F++ (F0  G  ) it
follows that for all f;g 2 G0 (resp. f;g 2 F0)
f + (1   )g  g  f (resp. g  f  f + (1   )g)
for all  2 [0;1].
Clearly for f;g 2 F++ \ G   with f  g,
f  f + (1   )g  g
for all  2 [0;1].
We now suppose that F++ = G++, but F0 6= G0. Since F0 [ F   = G0 [ G  , then also F   6= G  .
Moreover, either F0 \ G   6= ; or G0 \ F   6= ;
Note that if F0 \ G   6= ; and G0 \ F   6= ;, then for f 2 F0 \ G   and g 2 G0 \ F   it follows f  g
and g  f. A contradiction.
Assume without loss of generality that F0 \ G   6= ; and G0 \ F   = ;. Let f 2 F0 \ G  . Let g 2 G0,
then g  f since f 2 G  . Moreover, since f 2 F0, the g 2 F++. It follows G0  F++. A contradiction,
since F++ = G++ and G++ \ G0 = ;. Therefore, either G0 = ; or F0 \ G   = ;. In the former case,
F0 [ F   = G   and we obtain the same result as for the case F++ 6= G++. In the latter case F0 = G0, i.e.,
the two partitions must be identical.
Proof of Proposition 2
Clearly, all convex functions are also quasi-convex. It suces to show that a quasi-convex function that
satises translation invariance is always convex. For all f;g 2 F we have:
(f + (1   )g)   ((f) + (1   )(g))
= ((f + (f)) + (1   )(g + (g))
 maxf(f + (f));(g + (g))g
= maxf0;0g = 0:
Hence,
(f + (1   )g)  (f) + (1   )(g):
That a quasi-concave function that satises translation invariance is always concave follows by a an analogous
argument.
Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show that an aspirational preference relation has functional representation  and that  satises the
properties listed in the theorem.
34Let  be a aspiration preference relation with partition F++;F  ;F0. Property 1 implies the existence of
an upper semi-continuous function  : F ! R such that f  g if and only if (f)  (g) (Theorem 4, Bosi and
Mehta [7]). That  is nondecreasing follows directly from Property 2 (that is, monotonicity of ). Property
3(i) implies quasi-concavity for  on F++. Indeed, let f;g 2 F++ and assume without loss of generality that
f  g, then f+(1 )g  g, so (g+(1 )g)  (g) = min((f);(g)). An analogous argument follows for
quasi-convexity on F  . Moreover, strict ordering of the diversication favoring, neutral, and concentration
favoring sets implies (f) > (g) > (h) for all f 2 F++, g 2 F0, and h 2 F  . Finally, let g 2 F0 and
^ k = (g). Since  is indierent among acts in F0, ^ k does not depend on the choice of g 2 F0.
On the other hand, let  : F ! R \ f 1;1g be upper semi-continuous and increasing function
and F++;F  ;F0 be a partition of F. Assume  is quasi-concave on F++, quasi-convex on F  , and
(g) = ^ k 2 R [ f 1;1g for all g 2 F0, (f) > ^ k > (h) for all f 2 F++, h 2 F  . Dene a prefer-
ence relation  with f  g if and only if (f)  (g). Since  is upper semi-continuous, then it follows from
Bosi and Mehta [7] that  satises (i) and (ii) in Property 1. It is straightforward to show that  also satises
Properties 2 and 3 with the partition F++;F  ;F0. Thus  is an aspirational preference relation.
Now suppose  takes the form (3), where fkg is the family of risk measures as described. Let F++ =
ff 2 F : (f) > ^ kg, F   = ff 2 F : (f) < ^ kg and F0 = ff 2 F : (f) = ^ kg. We show that  denes an
aspirational preference relation with partition F++;F  ;F0.
1. Upper semi-continuity of :
Upper semi-continuity for  is equivalent to ff 2 F : (f)  kg being closed for all k. Let k 2 R and
take a sequence (fn)n in ff 2 F : (f)  kg such that fn ! f as n ! 1. Since (fn)  k, then k(fn)  0.
Therefore, the sequence (fn)n belongs to the acceptance set Ak. Since Ak is closed, than f 2 Ak, i.e.,
k(f)  0. This implies (f)  k, i.e., f 2 ff 2 F : (f)  kg. This proves that ff 2 F : (f)  kg is closed
for all k, and thus  is upper semi-continuous.
2.  nondecreasing: Follows clearly from monotonicity of the underlying risk measures.
3. Mixing: First, by denition of F++;F   and F0 given above, acts in F++ are strictly preferred to acts in
F0, which are strictly preferred to acts in F  .
a. Quasi-concavity over diversication favoring acts: Let f;g 2 F++ and k = minf(f);(g)g > ^ k. Note
35that k(f)  0 and k(f)  0 for all k 2 (^ k;k). Then, using convexity of k on k > ^ k, we have
(f + (1   )g) = supfk 2 R : k(f + (1   )g)  0g
 sup
n








b. Quasi-convexity over concentration favoring acts: Let f;g 2 F   and k = maxf(f);(g)g < ^ k. Note
that k(f) > 0 and k(g) > 0 for all k > k. Hence, for all k 2 (k;^ k),
k(f + (1   )g)  k(f) + (1   )k(g) > 0:
Since k is nondecreasing in k, the above inequality also holds for k > k. Therefore, we have
(f + (1   )g) = supfk 2 R : k(f + (1   )g)  0g
= supfk 2 ( 1;k] : k(f + (1   )g)  0g
 k
= maxf(f);(g)g:
We now show that the functional representation  of an aspirational preference relation takes the form
(3) where the family of risk measures fkg is dened in Equation (4). Since  is nondecreasing, k is nonde-
creasing in k. To verify that k is a risk measure with a closed acceptance set, we note the following:
1. Closed acceptance set:
We show that k(f)  0 is equivalent to (f)  k. One direction is trivial, i.e., when (f)  k then
k(f)  0. For the other direction, we note that upper semi-continuity for  implies upper semi-continuity for
a ! (f +a), for all f 2 F. Moreover, since a ! (a+f) is also increasing due to  being increasing, then it
is also right-continuous and the limit of Problem (4) is achievable. It follows that when k(f)  0, then there
exists an a  0 such that (a + f)  k. Due  being increasing we also have (f)  k. We have thus showed:
Ak = ff 2 F : k(f)  0g = ff 2 F : (f)  kg:




For all constant acts x 2 F,
k(f + x) = inffa : (f + x + a)  kg
= inffa   x : (f + a)  kg
= k(f)   x:
4. Convexity on k > ^ k:
Given f; g 2 F, since  is increasing and the denition of k, we have for all  > 0,
(f + k(f) + )  k
and
(g + k(g) + )  k:
Since k > ^ k, we have f + k(f) + ;g + k(g) +  2 F++. For every  2 [0;1], dene
a , k(f) + (1   )k(g):
Then, for all  > 0,
(f + (1   )g + a + ) = ((f + k(f) + ) + (1   )(g + k(g) + ))
 minf(f + k(f) + );(g + k(g) + )g
 k > ^ k:
Then
k(f + (1   )g) = inf fa : (f + (1   )g + a)  kg
 a
= k(f) + (1   )k(g):
5. Concavity on k < ^ k:
Since k(f) = inffa : (f +a)  kg, it follows that (f +k(f)+a) < k < ^ k and (g+k(g)+a) < k < ^ k
for all a < 0. Therefore, for all a < 0, f + k(f) + a 2 F  , and g + k(g) + a 2 F  ; hence,
((f + k(f)) + (1   )(g + k(g)) + a)  maxf(f + k(f) + a);(g + k(g) + a)g < k
37for all  2 [0;1]. Therefore,
k((f + k(f)) + (1   )(g + k(g)))
= inffa : ((f + k(f) + (1   )(g + k(g)) + a)  kg
= inffa : ((f + k(f)) + (1   )(g + k(g)) + a)  k;a  0g
 0:
Concavity then follows from the translation invariance property of k.
Finally, we need to show that
(f) = supfk 2 R : k(f)  0g:
We have seen in (i) above that the limit of Problem (4) is achievable. Therefore,
supfk 2 R : k(f)  0g = supfk 2 R : 9a  0 s:t: (f + a)  kg
= supf(f + a) : a  0g
= (f);
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that f (1) g. Then E [u(f)]  E [u(g)] for all u nondecreasing. Since u(x) is nondecreasing if and only
if  u( x) is also nondecreasing, we have  E [u( f)]   E [u( g)], or, equivalently, E [u( f)]  E [u( g)]
for u nondecreasing. This implies that  g (1)  f. Therefore,
 (f) =  ( f)   ( g) =  (g):
For SSD, we observe that a function u(x) is nondecreasing and concave if and only if  u( x) is nondecreasing
and convex. Hence, f (2) g if and only if  g ( 2)  g. Similarly to above, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that if f (1) g, then k(f)  k(g) for all k 2 R since k preserves FSD. By the denition of , it
follows immediately that (f)  (g), i.e.,  also preserves FSD.
For the next claim, note that g 2 F++ implies that (g) > ^ k. Since f (2) g and (g) preserves SSD, we
have
(g)(f)  (g)(g)  0:
Therefore, (f)  (g).
Likewise, g 2 F   implies that (g) < ^ k. Since f ( 2) g and (g) preserves RSSD, we have
(g)(f)  (g)(g)  0:
Therefore, (f)  (g).
38Proof of Proposition 5
First, it is easy to see that law-invariance of the aspiration measure implies law-invariance of the underlying
family of risk measures (see Equation 4). F ollmer and Schied [22] show that on atomless probability spaces
any law-invariant risk measure preserves FSD, and any convex, law-invariant risk measure preserves SSD; the
claim now follows by Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Lemma 1
We have:
u = inffa 2 R : (a) = 1g = inffa 2 R : k(a)  0; for all k 2 Rg





l = inffa 2 R : (a) >  1g = inffa 2 R : 9k 2 R withk(a)  0g




Proof of Proposition 6
It is straightforward to verify the concavity and nondecreasing properties of  k. Moreover, for all k > 0,
































= 2k(0)   inf
k>0







Hence,   k(f)  k(f) for all k > 0. Therefore, for all s < 0;t > 0,
 s(f)  lim
k"0
 k(f)  lim
k#0
k(f)  t(f):
Proof of Theorem 2
The boundedness properties for the family f~ kg imply k(f) k(0)  E [ f] for k > 0 and k(f) k(0) 
E [ f] for k < 0. It follows that when E [f] < l, then for all k > 0
k(f)  E [ f] + k(0)  E [ f] + l > 0:
39The second inequality follows from Lemma 1, since l = infk2R k(0). Since k(f) > 0 for all k > 0, it follows
from Theorem 1 that (f)  0. Likewise, if E [f]  u, then for all k < 0,
k(f)  E [ f] + k(0)  E [ f] + u  0:
Again the second inequality follows from Lemma 1, since u = supk2R k(0). Since k(f)  0 for all k < 0,
from Theorem 1, we have (f)  0.
Proof of Proposition 7
Since these are symmetric families of risk measures, it suces to show that k(f)  E [ f] for k > 0, which
implies that for k < 0
k(f) =   k( f)  E [ f]:







lnexp(E [ kf]) =  E [f]:








f + E [( f   )+]g
 inf
2R
f + E [ f   ]g
= E [ f]:
Finally, for the homogenized entropic risk measure, we have
k(f) = inf
a>0








Proof of Proposition 8
First, it is clear that (fA   ) = 1 and (fB   ) < 1 for any  2 (0;y]. We thus focus on comparing C to
D over the range  2 (0;y].
There is a one-to-one mapping between target levels and SAM levels. In particular, for a particular SAM
level , let (fC;) and (fD;) be the corresponding target levels that induce the SAM level  for gambles













1 + q(e y   1)

:
40Note that (fC;) and (fD;) are both decreasing and continuous in . We will compare these target
functions as  varies and will show that there exists a unique ? > 0 such that (fC;?) = (fD;?), and that
(fD;) > (fC;) for all  > ?, and (fD;) < (fC;) for all  < ?. This shows that (fC ) > (fD )
if and only if  > (fC;?) = (fD;?).
First, consider  < 0. Over this range, we have












1 + q(e y   1)

, p(e x   1)   q(e y   1) > 0:
Let v() = p(e x   1)   q(e y   1), the left hand side of the latter inequality. Over  < 0, we have
v0() =  pxe x + qye y
< qy(e y   e x)
< 0;







In sum, v() is a strictly decreasing function from +1 to 0 as  " 0 and therefore must be strictly positive
over the range, which implies that v() > 0 over  < 0, and thus (fC;) > (fD;) over this range.
For  = 0, the target levels reduce to the expected values; thus, (fC;0) = px > qy = (fD;0).
Finally, consider  > 0. Similar to the rst case, we have over this range
(fC;) > (fD;) , p(e x   1)   q(e y   1) < 0:
Let w() = p(e x  1) q(e y  1), the left hand side of the latter inequality. We have lim#0 w() = 0 and
lim!1 w() = q   p > 0. Moreover, w0() =  pxe x + qye y, so










=   > 0:
Thus, w() over   0 has a left limit of zero, a right limit of the positive value q p, and is nonincreasing for
    and increasing otherwise. This implies that there exists a unique ?    > 0 when w() crosses zero.
Note furthermore that w(?) = 0 is equivalent to (fC;?) = (fD;?), i.e., ?(fC) = ?(fD). Also, since
? > 0, we must have (fC;?) = (fD;?) < E [fD] = qy as claimed.
In summary, we have shown that there is a single target level ? with the desired construction such that
the SAM levels of C and D coincide at ?; below ?, D is preferred to C and vice versa for above ?. This
completes the proof.
41Proof of Proposition 9
First, notice that for any  < y, (fA   ) = 1 and (fB   ) < 1, so (fA   ) > (fB   ). Now
consider C and D. For D, any target  < y induces a corresponding value ^ () = (fD   ), where using the





(1   q)e ^ ()y + q
i
=   ,  =  ^ ()(fD)
must hold. Notice that ^ () is monotonically decreasing on  2 (0;y). In order to have (fC  ) > (fD ),
we must have ^ ()(fC   ) < 0. Considering separately the two cases whether ^ () > 0 or ^ ()  0, we nd





pe ^ ()x + (1   p)
i
<  y , ^ ()(fB   y) < 0:
Therefore, we can choose  small enough such that ^ ()  (fB  y) holds, which leads to the threshold value
? in the result. Notice that x > y > 0 and p > 0 imply that ? = (fB   y) > 0; this in conjunction with
q < 1 implies that ? =  ?(fD) < y.
For y >  > ?, we have ^ () < ?, so (fC   ) > (fD   ) and (fA   ) > (fB   ) over the range
(?;y), as required.
Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose there exists a Q 2 Q such that EQ [f] < l. From Theorem 2, we have, for k > 0,
k(f) = sup
Q2Q
Q;k(f)  Q;k(f)  EQ [ f] + Q;k(0) > 0;
where the strict inequality follows by EQ [f] < l and Lemma 1. Hence, (f)  0. Likewise, suppose there
exists a Q 2 Q such that EQ [f]  u; we have, for k < 0,
k(f) = inf
Q2Q
Q;k(f)  Q;k(f)  EQ [ f] + Q;k(0)  0;
and again invoking the representation theorem for SAM, it must be that (f)  0.
Proof of Proposition 10




s.t.   Eq [f]  ;
Eq [1] = 1
q(y)  0; 8y 2 [f;f]:
42We can consider q to be an innite dimensional vector indexed by y 2 [f;f]. By weak duality, the upper









r + s   t : r  max
y2[f;f]










maxfexp( af)   fs + ft;exp( af)   fs + ftg + s   t : s;t  0
	
:
By inspection, when a  0, strong duality is obtained by a two point distribution P with P(f = f) = p and
P(f = f) = q and dual variables s = 0, t = (exp( af)   exp( af))=(f   f)  0: Likewise, when a < 0,
strong duality is achieved by a two point distribution with P(f = f) = p and P(f = f) = q and dual variables
s = (exp( af)   exp( ax))=(f   f)  0, t = 0:
43Tables
ESAM
 Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D
55,000 1 83:7  10 6 1:90  10 6 0
250,000 1 18:4  10 6 0  8:36  10 6
500,000 1 4:80  10 6  0:60  10 6  1
695,000  1 0  0:92  10 6  1
2,000,000  1  4:60  10 6  4:60  10 6  1
HESAM
 Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D
55,000 1 3.76490 0:04798 0.00000
250,000 1 1.66770 0:00000 -0.46876
500,000 1 0.08759  0:04440  1
695,000 -1 0:00000  0:12513  1
2,000,000 -1  1:19251  1:36274  1
CVaR SAM
 Gamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble D
55,000 1 4.48864 0:08311 0.00000
250,000 1 3.91202 0:00000 -1.51413
500,000 1 0.10259  0:69315  1
695,000 -1 0:00000  1:02245  1
2,000,000 -1  2:01490  2:07944  1
Table 2: Values attributed to gambles A, B, C, and D described in the main text, by various strong aspiration
measures for dierent values of the target . In bold are the preferred gambles in each pair for each target.
44ESAM HESAM CVaR SAM
 Gamble A Gamble B Gamble A Gamble B Gamble A Gamble B
10 0:10986 0.04055 0:92936 0.28243 1:06471 0.37156
30 0:03662 0.01320 0:70421 0.14970 0:99325 0.30010
50 0:02192 0.00688 0:53253 0.07043 0:91629 0.22314
70 0:01542 0.00347 0:39361 0.02393 0:83291 0.13976
90 0:01153 0.00104 0:27980 0.00254 0:74194 0.04879
110 0:00876 0.00000 0:18730 0.00000 0:64185 0.00000
130 0:00655 0.00000 0:11402 0.00000 0:53063 0.00000
150 0:00462 0.00000 0:05889 0.00000 0:40547 0.00000
170 0:00281 0.00000 0:02160 0.00000 0:26236 0.00000
190 0:00097 0.00000 0:00246 0.00000 0:09531 0.00000
210 -0.00104 0:00000 -0.00254 0:00000 -0.04879 0:00000
230 -0.00347 0:00000 -0.02393 0:00000 -0.13976 0:00000
250 -0.00688 0:00000 -0.07043 0:00000 -0.22314 0:00000
270 -0.01320 0:00000 -0.14970 0:00000 -0.30010 0:00000
290 -0.04055 0:00000 -0.28243 0:00000 -0.37156 0:00000
 Gamble C Gamble D Gamble C Gamble D Gamble C Gamble D
10 0.00000 0:04055 0.00000 0:28243 0.00000 0:37156
30 0.00000 0:01320 0.00000 0:14970 0.00000 0:30010
50 0.00000 0:00688 0.00000 0:07043 0.00000 0:22314
70 0.00000 0:00347 0.00000 0:02393 0.00000 0:13976
90 0.00000 0:00104 0.00000 0:00254 0.00000 0:04879
110 0:00000 -0.00097 0:00000 -0.00246 0:00000 -0.09531
130 0:00000 -0.00281 0:00000 -0.02160 0:00000 -0.26236
150 0:00000 -0.00462 0:00000 -0.05889 0:00000 -0.40547
170 0:00000 -0.00655 0:00000 -0.11402 0:00000 -0.53063
190 0:00000 -0.00876 0:00000 -0.18730 0:00000 -0.64185
210  0:00104 -0.01153  0:00254 -0.27980  0:04879 -0.74194
230  0:00347 -0.01542  0:02393 -0.39361  0:13976 -0.83291
250  0:00688 -0.02192  0:07043 -0.53253  0:22314 -0.91629
270  0:01320 -0.03662  0:14970 -0.70421  0:30010 -0.99325
290  0:04055 -0.10986  0:28243 -0.92936  0:37156 -1.06471
Table 3: Values attributed to gambles A, B, C and D given in the main text by entropic (columns 1-2),
homogenous entropic (columns 3-4) and CVaR SAM (columns 5-6), as function of the target . In bold are
the preferred gambles in each pair for each target.
45 ($k)
(0,3.96) [3.96,4] (4,5.98) [5.98] (5.98,7.96) [7.96,8] (8,12]
f1 vs. f2 = = f1 = f2 f2 =
f3 vs. f4 f3 = = = = f4 f4
Table 4: Preferences for Machina [34] example using ESAM (target ranges computed from various expected
values and are rounded to two digits).
46High gamble Low gamble ESAM results
Trial G p L G' p' L' % High n (fHigh) (fLow) ESAM prefers?
1 150 0.3 -25 75 0.8 -60 22.20% 81 0.0123 0.0246 Low
2 1800 0.05 -200 600 0.3 -250 21.00% 81 -0.0007 0.0001 Low
3 1000 0.25 -500 600 0.5 -700 28.30% 60 -0.0005 -0.0002 Low
4 200 0.3 -25 75 0.8 -100 33.30% 72 0.0134 0.0122 High
5 1200 0.25 -500 600 0.5 -800 43.10% 72 -0.0003 -0.0004 High
6 750 0.4 -1000 500 0.6 -1500 51.40% 72 -0.0008 -0.0007 Low
7 4200 0.5 -3000 3000 0.75 -6000 51.90% 81 0.0001 0.0001 High
8 4500 0.5 -1500 3000 0.75 -3000 48.30% 60 0.0004 0.0004 High
9 4500 0.5 -3000 3000 0.75 -6000 58.30% 60 0.0001 0.0001 High
10 1000 0.3 -200 400 0.7 -500 51.30% 80 0.0014 0.0014 High
12 3000 0.01 -490 2000 0.02 -500 59.30% 81 -0.0013 -0.0017 High
11 4800 0.5 -1500 3000 0.75 -3000 54.20% 72 0.0004 0.0004 High
13 2200 0.4 -600 850 0.75 -1700 51.70% 60 0.0007 0.0003 High
14 2000 0.2 -1000 1700 0.25 -1100 57.60% 59 -0.0004 -0.0005 High
15 1500 0.25 -500 600 0.5 -900 51.30% 80 0 -0.0005 High
16 5000 0.5 -3000 3000 0.75 -6000 65.00% 80 0.0001 0.0001 High
17 1500 0.4 -1000 600 0.8 -3500 58.80% 80 0 -0.0002 High
18 2025 0.5 -875 1800 0.6 -1000 71.70% 60 0.0006 0.0007 Low
19 600 0.25 -100 125 0.75 -500 57.50% 80 0.0022 -0.0009 High
20 5000 0.1 -900 1400 0.3 -1700 40.00% 60 -0.0002 -0.0007 High
21 700 0.25 -100 125 0.75 -600 71.30% 80 0.0024 -0.0014 High
22 700 0.5 -150 350 0.75 -400 63.30% 60 0.0045 0.0025 High
23 1200 0.3 -200 400 0.7 -800 70.00% 80 0.0015 0.0003 High
24 5000 0.5 -2500 2500 0.75 -6000 78.80% 80 0.0002 0.0001 High
25 800 0.4 -1000 500 0.6 -1600 57.50% 80 -0.0007 -0.0008 High
26 5000 0.5 -3000 2500 0.75 -6500 71.30% 80 0.0001 0 High
27 700 0.25 -100 100 0.75 -800 72.50% 80 0.0024 -0.0025 High
28 1500 0.3 -200 400 0.7 -1000 75.00% 80 0.0017 -0.0001 High
29 1600 0.25 -500 600 0.5 -1100 72.50% 80 0.0001 -0.0007 High
30 2000 0.4 -800 600 0.8 -3500 65.00% 80 0.0004 -0.0002 High
31 2000 0.25 -400 600 0.5 -1100 80.00% 80 0.0005 -0.0007 High
32 1500 0.4 -700 300 0.8 -3500 77.50% 80 0.0003 -0.0007 High
33 900 0.4 -1000 500 0.6 -1800 70.00% 80 -0.0005 -0.0008 High
34 1000 0.4 -1000 500 0.6 -2000 77.50% 80 -0.0004 -0.0009 High
Table 5: ESAM applied to gambles High and Low in experiments from Wu and Markle [50] (ESAM values
rounded to four decimal points). 47Asset vi vi i i
1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2 -30.0 6.0 4.0 5.0
3 -40.0 8.0 5.0 6.0
4 -50.0 10.0 8.0 9.0
5 -60.0 15.0 11.0 12.0
6 -100.0 20.0 15.0 16.0
Table 6: Supports [vi;vi] of the distributions of assets' percentage returns Vi and the corresponding ranges
[i;i] for the expected returns for the portfolio choice example in Section 5.
Asset
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.0 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1
3.0 0.718 0.065 0.049 0.077 0.054 0.036 0.3220
4.0 0.435 0.130 0.099 0.155 0.109 0.073 0.1610
5.0 0.153 0.195 0.148 0.232 0.163 0.109 0.1073
6.0 0.000 0.192 0.164 0.292 0.210 0.142 0.0795
7.0 0.000 0.069 0.138 0.348 0.261 0.183 0.0585
9.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.350 0.361 0.289 0.0315
11.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.488 0.512 0.0146
14.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.0031
18.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.0136
Table 7: Optimal asset allocation under the ESAM for various values of the target  for the portfolio choice
example in Section 5.
48